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Private Maritime Security Companies v.
Pirates: The Battle of Legality
VANESSA ZEHNDER†

I. INTRODUCTION
Under the blue skies, and amid the calm waters of the Indian
Ocean, a small boat that appears as a mere dot on the horizon
approaches a massive cargo ship.1 The serenity of the ocean is quickly
shattered when a voice calls for warning shots through a radio. 2
Immediately following this order is the sound of rapid gun fire at the
hands of a private security team.3 While the radio transmission only
called for warning shots, there is no pause between the initial shots and
the countless additional shots that follow.4 The gunfire continues for
over one minute and causes the targeted skiff to lose control and collide
with the cargo ship prior to drifting off into the horizon.5 Before the
initial skiff is out of sight, another pirate skiff approaches the cargo
ship and is met with similar gunfire.6 The situation depicted above
illustrates the problem of allowing private maritime security
companies (“PMSCs”) to “self-regulate”7 in the fight against piracy,
© 2018 Vanessa Zehnder
† J.D. Candidate (2019), University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The
author thanks her editors, Shannon Himes, Jess OrDonez, Rebeca Garcia Gil, Justen Barbierri,
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1. J W, Pirates Dead Bodies Floats as Pirates Fails and Shredded to Pieces. Pirates
Tries
to
Hijack
the
Wrong
Vessel,
YOUTUBE
(July
14,
2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h5_oeFLpRvc.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. David Isenberg, The Rise of Private Maritime Security Companies, HUFFINGTON
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which must be solved by implementing regulations for PMSCs to
follow to protect both American ships, as well as international ships.8
Piracy is known as the “original universal jurisdiction crime.”9
Universal jurisdiction enables states to pursue pirates regardless of
their nationality.10 The region in which piracy is most prevalent, and
earned the name “Pirate Alley”, is the horn of Africa, which creates
momentous difficulties because the Gulf of Aden is a heavily traveled
commercial shipping route.11 While the function of protecting ships
against piracy is generally performed by the states, in recent times
there has been a shift towards utilizing PMSCs for such protection.12
Currently, “quick fix” solutions include using PMSCs as state
employed anti-piracy task forces and as private security for merchant
vessels traversing high-risk piracy regions.13 In some cases this has led
to a presumption of guilt by the PMSC prior to proving guilt, and
sometimes even a death sentence before proving guilt or providing any
legal process.14 While it is legal for a state to pursue and seize pirates
with its military, questions remain in regards to the largely unregulated
grey area of using PMSCs to protect against piracy. 15
This article will examine piracy as defined by the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) and other
international statutory laws, as well as the history of piracy and the
lack of regulation for PMSC.16 This article will then argue that PMSCs
should have the legal ability to protect vessels and their cargo against
pirates, a function generally performed by states, when performed in a
regulated manner, by utilizing a mechanism such as letters of marque.17
Lastly, this article will analyze potential solutions for when PMSCs
and pirates come into contact without regulation.18

POST (May 29, 2012, 1:50 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/privatemilitary-contractors_b_1548523.html.
8. Infra Part III(C).
9. Tara Helfman, Marauders in the Courts: Why the Federal Courts Have Got the
Problem of Maritime Piracy (Partly) Wrong, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 55 (2012).
10. Id.
11. Sean Patrick Mahard, Blackwater’s New Battlefield: Toward a Regulatory Regime in
the United States for Privately Armed Contractors Operating at Sea, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 331 (2014).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See J W, supra note 1.
15. Helfman, supra note 9, at 56.
16. Infra Part II.
17. Infra Part III.
18. Infra Part III(C).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Defining and Tracing the History of Piracy
Those who commit piracy have been labeled “communis hostis
omnium,” which translates to the “common enemy of all.”19 Piracy is
internationally defined by UNCLOS as:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act
of
depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the
passengers
of
a
private
ship
or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship
or aircraft, or against persons or property on board
such
ship
or
aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a
place
outside
the
jurisdiction of any State.20
Additionally, Article 105 of UNCLOS supports universal
jurisdiction to enforce against piracy, by providing that “every State
may seize a pirate ship or aircraft.”21 The United Nations Security
Counsel passed Resolution 2316, in addition to a variety of other
resolutions,22 in an effort to provide authorization for nations to pursue
pirates and to patrol the waters in high risk piracy areas, regardless of
whether the area is within the high seas or territorial Somali waters.23
In terms of international law, territorial sea means “the sovereignty of
a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters
and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an
adjacent belt of sea.”24 High seas refer to “the open ocean, not part of
the exclusive economic zone, territorial sea or internal waters of any
19. Jonathan Bellish, The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2012, (Oceans Beyond Piracy,
Working Paper, 2012).
20. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 101
[Hereinafter “UNCOLS”]. (The United States has signed, but the Senate has not ratified.)
21. Id. at 105.
22. See generally S.C. Res. 1676 (May 10, 2006); S.C. Res. 1838 (Oct. 7, 2008); S.C.
Res. 1846 (Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1851 (Dec. 16, 2008); S.C. Res. 1897 (Nov. 30, 2009);
S.C. Res. 1918 (Apr. 27, 2010); S.C. Res. 1950 (Nov. 23, 2010); S.C. Res. 1976 (Apr. 11,
2011); S.C. Res. 2015 (Oct. 24, 2011); S.C. Res. 2020 (Nov. 22, 2011); S.C. Res. 2077 (Nov.
21, 2012); S.C. Res. 2383 (Nov. 7, 2017).
23. See S.C. Res. 2316 (Nov. 9, 2016) (Unanimously adopted to renew previous
resolutions in regards to the fight against piracy and calls on both the Somali authorities and
the states to do what they can to fight piracy).
24. UNCOLS, supra note 20 at Part II.
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state.”25
We often think of piracy as loosely organized and generally
committed by poor individuals, that is no longer the reality of the
situation.26 In Somalia, piracy has become a very lucrative, socially
acceptable profession and has created a new group of elites who own
large homes, new cars, and vacation internationally. 27 Piracy has
developed extensively to the point where the tables have turned to the
rumored point of international businessmen asking pirates for loans.28
While piracy has preyed on innocent ships for hundreds of
years, it has made its appearance on the big screen in many recent
works.29 The most well-known and realistic depiction being the 2013
film, Captain Phillips.30 The film’s director, Paul Greengrass, referred
to the situation portrayed in the film as “a complex portrait of the
myriad effects of globalization.”31 This film portrays the events of
April 8, 2009, when Somali Pirates targeted the Maersk Alabama,
which was en route to East Africa to deliver food aid.32 The situation,
which occurred 145 miles off the Somali coast, progressed into a
hostage situation and U.S. military forces ultimately killed the
pirates.33 While this particular story was turned into a blockbuster hit,
it shares many similarities with the other 217 pirate attacks in 2009.34
1. United States
In addition to its presence in international law, piracy also has
roots within the legal system of the United States of America.35 The
25. High Seas, Duhaime’s Law Dictionary (online ed.).
26. Robyn Hunter, Somali Pirates Living the High Life, BBC NEWS (Oct. 28, 2008, 9:16
AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7650415.stm.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. CAPTAIN PHILLIPS (Sony Pictures 2013).
30. Id.
31. Captain Phillips, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1535109/ (last visited Apr. 15,
2018).
32. Jennifer S. Martin, Fighting Piracy with Private Security Measures: When Contract
Law Should Tell Parties to Walk the Plank, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1363, 1364 (2010).
33. Id.
34. Jonathan Saul & Royce Cheah, Piracy Attacks at Six-Year High in 2009: Watchdog,
REUTERS
(Jan.
14,
2010,
8:19
AM),
https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE60D0DA20100114; CAPTAIN PHILLIPS, supra
note 29.
35. Piracy Under Law of Nations 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1948) (“Whoever, on the high seas,
commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into
or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life.”). U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“To define
and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of
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United States piracy statute automatically calls for a life sentence. 36
While the definition of piracy seems relatively straightforward,
multiple legal cases disagree on what exactly is necessary to constitute
the crime of piracy.37 In the United States courts, the main point of
contention is whether an actual taking is necessary to constitute piracy
in the situation of an attempted attack that did not reach the point of a
successful taking.38 An actual taking is defined as: “a physical
appropriation of an owner’s property by an entity clothed with
eminent-domain authority.”39 In the 2010 case, United States v. Hasan,
the defendants thought they were attacking a merchant vessel, but
actually attacked a United States Navy vessel.40 The district court held
that an actual taking is not required to qualify as piracy, and the statute
can be fulfilled by an “act of violence” committed “on the high seas”
for “private ends.”41 Similarly, two years later in United States v. Dire,
the Fourth Circuit found that Congress’ proscription of piracy under
18 U.S.C. § 1651 “necessarily incorporated modern developments in
international law” and that UNCLOS article 101 defines general
piracy42 under modern customary international law.43 Thus, the fourth
circuit upheld jury instructions which do not require a taking to fulfill
the crime of piracy.44
Piracy does not solely target large commercial vessels.45 Pirates
kidnapped Rachel and Paul Chandlers, an older British couple, from
their small yacht and held them hostage for thirteen months until their
family paid the ransom.46 Stemming from another incident, United
States v. Shibin dealt with Mohammed Saaili Shibin who served as a
translator on behalf of the pirates that were holding the twenty-two
person crew of the M/V Marida Marguerite hostage, after they seized

nations”).
36. U.S.C. § 1651.
37. William Crum McKinney, United States v. Said & United States v. Hasan, 62 S.C.L.
REV. 577 (2011). See United States v. Said, 680 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2012); see also United
States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2010).
38. Said, 680 F.3d; Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d.
39. Taking, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
40. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d.
41. Id.
42. See UNCOLS, supra note 20.
43. United States v. Abdi Wali Dire, 680 F.3d 446 (4th Cir. 2012).
44. Id.
45. Decca Aitkenhead, Paul and Rachel Chandler: How We Survived Being Kidnapped
by
Somali
Pirates,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
30,
2011),
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/oct/30/paul-rachel-chandler-kidnap-somali-pirates.
46. Id.
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the ship on the high seas.47 Further, the pirates that hijacked the yacht
“Quest”, identified Shibin as the person responsible for negotiating
with authorities days before the pirates shot and killed all four United
States citizen hostages.48 While Shibin did not board the M/V
Marguerite until the pirates brought it into Somali waters and the S/V
Quest never made it back to Somalia for him to board, the court held
he could still be found guilty of aiding and abetting piracy.49 The court
ultimately found Shibin guilty on all counts with a sentence in excess
of twelve life terms.50
2. Somalia
Both interesting and troubling is that to this day Somalia has not
successfully passed anti-piracy legislation.51 In 2012, Somali piracy
cost the international economy a total of USD 5.7-6.1 billion.52 This
amount comes from a variety of expenses including ransoms, recovery,
and insurance.53 Things such as security equipment and guards,
rerouting to avoid high-piracy areas, increased speeds to evade pirates
leading to higher fuel costs for ships, military operations, and counterpiracy organizations also add to the high cost.54 Expenses do not stop
after the pirate attacks occur due to costs of labor, prosecutions, and
imprisonment of pirates.55 Somalia was not a signatory to the first and
second UNCLOS negotiations because it had not yet gained its
independence.56 In order for a state to be a signatory, the state “signs a
document, personally or through an agent, and thereby becomes a party
to an agreement.”57
47. United States v. Shibin, No. 2:11CR33, 2012 WL 8231152, at *1 (E.D. Va. Apr. 16,
2012).
48. Id. (During the course of his negotiations, Shibin utilized tactics such as
psychological and physical torture of the crew of the M/V Marida Marguerite. For a period of
time while holding the crew hostage, Shibin was in the role of a regular pirate and carried an
AK-47 and guarded the hostages); Eliza Griswold, How the Somali Pirate Victims Became
Martyrs, THE DAILY BEAST (Feb. 23, 2011), https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-somalipirate-victims-became-martyrs (Scott and Jean Adam were missionaries that were on their
way to deliver Bibles to underserved nations).
49. United States v. Shibin, 722 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2013).
50. Id.
51. Afyare Elmi & Ladan Affi, Barriers to Developing Anti-Piracy Law in Somalia,
ALJAZEERA
CENTRE
FOR
STUDIES
(Nov.
20,
2014),
http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2014/11/2014112010310522448.html.
52. Bellish, supra note 19.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Elmi & Affi, supra note 51.
57. Signatory, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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However, Somalia did adopt the 1959 Marine Code, which was
prepared during the United Nations trusteeship era, and gave Somalia
six nautical miles of territorial sea.58 The Marine Code covers piracy,
and defines it as a crime that is committed by individuals on board a
ship, punishable by imprisonment for ten to twenty years, regardless
of whether it occurs in the high seas or territorial waters. 59 A 1966
amendment to the Marine Code of 1959 increased Somalia’s territorial
sea from six nautical miles to twelve nautical miles.60 In 1972, Somalia
passed Law 37 in response to the trend of claiming large amounts of
territorial sea as the negotiation preparations for UNCLOS III began,
which expanded Somalia’s territorial sea from twelve nautical miles to
200 nautical miles.61 Interestingly, Law 37 did not mention piracy and
stated that Somali Penal Law would govern any offenses occurring
within the territorial sea.62 On January 26, 1989, in order to be in line
with UNCLOS, Somalia’s National Assembly approved the Somali
Law of the Sea, Law No. 5, which brought Somalia’s territorial sea
back down to twelve miles.63 By passing Law No. 5, Somalia once
again passed a law regarding the sea that made no mention of piracy.64
Somalia began working on its ratification of UNCLOS III in early
1989 and repealed Law 37, which led to Somalia becoming the fortieth
state to ratify the Convention on July 24, 1989.65 The widely held
public opinion in Somalia, that Kenya is trying to steal its territories
and resources, has added to the difficulty of passing any laws related
to the sea and anti-piracy.66
3. International Approach
Not all governments utilize the same approach to piracy. In
addition to the counter-piracy operations of individual states, there are
multiple international organizations that are active in the fight against
piracy.67 These include the European Union’s Naval Force Operation
58. M ARITIME CODE , Preliminary Provision, art. 1: Territorial Sea. (Som.),
https://somaliswiss.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/somali-maritime-code-21-03-19591.pdf;
Elmi & Affi, supra note 51.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Law on the Somali Territorial Sea and Ports, Law No. 37 (Sept. 10, 1972) (Som.),
http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/SOM_1972_Law.
pdf.
62. Id.
63. Elmi & Affi, supra note 51.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See generally Press Release, Security Council, Unanimously Adopting Resolution
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ATALANTA, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Operation
Ocean Shield, the Combined Maritime Forces’ Combined Task Force
151, the African Union, and the Southern Africa Development
Community.68 Under European Union Council Joint Action 851, the
European Union Naval Force ATALANTA provides protection for
vessels including those of the World Food Programme, African Union
Mission in Somalia, and at risk shipping vessels.69 Additionally, the
European Union Naval Force ATALANTA works to “deter, prevent
and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali Coast.”70
Ukrainian M/V Juliet was able to thwart off attackers because of the
protection she received from the force.71 In 2009, the Internationally
Recognized Transit Corridor was established through the Gulf of Aden
by the International Maritime Organization.72 Within this corridor,
coalition naval forces would escort merchant vessels.73 The
establishment of this guarded corridor led to pirates expanding further
into the north-west Indian Ocean.74 In October 2017, the European
Union committed 37.5 million euros towards counter piracy operations
and other maritime security.75
While it is typically the United States’ approach to never
negotiate with the “bad guys,” rumors suggest that the Spanish
government paid a ransom in excess of 3.5 million dollars for the

2383 (2017), Security Council Renews Authorization for International Naval Forces to Fight
Piracy off Coast of Somalia, U.N. Press Release SC/13058 (Nov. 7, 2017).
68. Id.
69. EU NAVFOR Somalia: Mission, EUROPEAN U NION EXTERNAL ACTION ,
http://eunavfor.eu/mission/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2018); The Council of the European Union,
Acts Adopted Under Title V of the EU Treaty Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, 301
OFFICIAL J. OF THE EUR. UNION 33, 33 (Nov. 10, 2008.
70. The Council of the European Union, supra note 69.
71. Martin, supra note 32, at 1365.
72. The Evolution of the Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI) and
Piracy
in
the
Indian
Ocean,
LESSONS
FROM
PIRACY,
http://www.lessonsfrompiracy.net/files/2014/06/DRAFT-The-Evolution-of-the-SecurityAssociation-for-the-Maritime-Industry-8-May-14.pdf; Piracy and Armed Robbery Against
Ships in Waters of Somalia, Ref. T2-OSS/2.7.1, INTERNATIONAL M ARITIME ORGANIZATION
(Aug.
3,
2009),
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Guidance/Documents/SN.1
-Circ.281.pdf; Introduction to IMO, INTERNATIONAL M ARITIME ORGANIZATION ,
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/Default.aspx (The International Maritime Organization
is a United Nations agency responsible for regulating international shipping).
73. The Evolution of the Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI) and
Piracy in the Indian Ocean, supra note 72.
74. Id.
75. Aiswarya Lakshmi, EU Leads the Way with Ambitious Action for Cleaner and Safer
Seas, MARINE LINK (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.marinelink.com/news/ambitious-cleaneraction430100.

ZEHNDER - PRIVATE MARITIME (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

5/15/2018 12:35 PM

PRIVATE MARITIME SECURITY COMPANIES V. PIRATES

343

release of the Spanish fishing ship, Alakrana, and its thirty-six person
crew.76 The Spanish Prime Minister stated that the “government did
what it had to do.”77 The United Arab Emirates is currently seeking a
seat in the decision making body of the International Maritime
Organisation on the basis of creating increased security.78 Due to
concerns about the impact of piracy on commercial shipping lanes in
the region, the United Arab Emirates has taken measures to fight piracy
both publically and by secretly funding anti-piracy operations.79
Dating back to the United Nations’ first Resolution regarding
piracy off the Somali coast in 2006, the United Nations condemned
acts of piracy.80 In a 2008 Resolution, the United Nations escalated to
calling for “nations with military capacity in the area to actively fight
piracy.”81 At a 2017 meeting of the United Nations Security Council,
the Council again gave primary responsibility in the fight against
piracy to the Somali authorities, while also recognizing the need for
international assistance by asking states that have the available
resources to help.82 In November 2017, the United Nations Security
Council unanimously renewed their “Authorization for International
Naval Forces to Fight Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.”83 This need for
international assistance stems from the fact that piracy occurs in an
area greater than one million square miles of the ocean.84
Illustrating how parts of the international community work
around the Somali authorities is that some Western navies will bring
alleged pirates to states with anti-piracy laws like Kenya, Seychelles,
and Mauritius to be prosecuted.85 Upon conviction, the United Nations
76. Somali Pirates Free Spanish Boat, BBC NEWS (Nov. 17, 2009, 4:31 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8364530.stm.
77. Id.
78. Ramola Talwar Badam, Updated: UAE’s bid for International Maritime
Organisation council seat would ‘boost security’, THE NAT’L (Oct. 2, 2017, 6:58 PM),
https://www.thenational.ae/uae/updated-uae-s-bid-for-international-maritime-organisationcouncil-seat-would-boost-security-1.663402.
79. Mark Mazzetti & Eric Schmitt, Private Army Formed to Fight Somali Pirates Leaves
Troubled
Legacy,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
4,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/05/world/africa/private-army-leaves-troubled-legacy-insomalia.html.
80. S.C. Res. 1676 (May 10, 2006).
81. S.C. Res. 1838 (Oct. 7, 2008).
82. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution
2316 (2016), Renewing Authorization for International Naval Forces to Combat Piracy off
Somali Coast, U.N. Press Release SC/12582 (Nov. 9, 2016).
83. Id.
84. Martin, supra note 32, at 1366.
85. Elmi & Affi, supra note 51.
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Office on Drugs and Crime (“UNODC”) relocates some of the inmates
to facilities in Somaliland and Puntland to serve their sentences. 86
Somaliland “engages in diplomatic operations with the United
Nations, the Arab League, the European Union and nations” but is not
a recognized state by the Union Nations.87 The decision by the
UNODC to send a number of pirates to non-Somali partners for their
incarceration “perpetuates the status quo.”88
B. The Grey Area: Legality of Private Security
While the ability of merchant vessels to protect themselves
against piracy appears within United States law, the law references
only “the commander and crew of any merchant vessel” and makes no
mention of additional contractors, such as private security personnel.89
To date, no legally binding regulations exist governing PMSCs.90
While PMSCs are required to follow the laws of the ship’s flagged
nation, most nations have minimal regulations for them.91 All merchant
ships are required to be registered to a state; the ship is, however,
allowed to select the state to which it registers.92 A lot of ships fly a
“flag of convenience,” which is “one that flies the flag of a country
other than the country of ownership.”93 Ship owners utilize so-called
flags of convenience because they provide a way around the more strict
regulations of other countries in respect to the aspects of wages, ship
conditions, and working conditions.94 Further complicating this
general lack of regulation is the unsettling idea that some PMSCs will
function under ships flagged to countries that do not have any

86. Id.
87. T.G., Why Somaliland is Not a Recognised State, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 1, 2015),
https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/11/economist-explains.
88. Elmi & Affi, supra note 51.
89. 33 U.S.C. § 383 (2012) (Authorizes merchant vessels to defend against piratical
attacks on the high seas; “[t]he commander and crew of any merchant vessel . . . may oppose
and defend against any aggression” by a nonpublic armed vessel).
90. Interim Guidance to Private Maritime Security Companies Providing Privately
Contracted Armed Security Personnel on Board Ships in the High Risk Area, §1.1, INT’L
M ARITIME
ORGANIZATION
(May.
25,
2012),
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Guidance/Documents/MSC.1Circ.1443.pdf.
91. Mahard, supra note 11, at 335.
92. Sharda, What are Flag States in the Shipping Industry?, MARINE INSIGHT (July 23,
2016), https://www.marineinsight.com/maritime-law/what-are-flag-states-in-the-shippingindustry-2/.
93. Flags
of
Convenience,
INT’L
TRANSPORT
WORKERS’
FED’N,
http://www.itfglobal.org/en/transport-sectors/seafarers/in-focus/flags-of-conveniencecampaign/.
94. Id.
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regulations to avoid dealing with any such restraints.95 This troubling
concept should be solved through the implementation of regulation,
which can be accomplished by utilizing the letters of marque.96 The
letters of marque would go beyond the issue of flags and allow the
PMSC to act on behalf of the state and the state would be able to
directly exercise control over the PMSC.97
This issue gained international attention on March 25, 2011, when
a private security commander aboard a merchant vessel in the Indian
Ocean ordered his men to fire at an approaching skiff that had not yet
fired any shots at the vessel.98 As described in the Introduction, the
privately contracted security personnel did not pause after firing the
ordered warning shots and continued to fire until the skiff was out of
sight.99 Trident Group, the United States employer of the guards aboard
the merchant vessel, later acknowledged that some of the pirates were
likely killed.100 In summary, employees of a company based in the
United States, a country where due process is an inherent element of
criminal justice, allowed its guards to fire in a fashion that any
reasonable person could expect to kill those on board the skiff, even
though only warning shots were called for.101
Additionally, another attempt to attack the aforementioned
merchant vessel, the Maersk Alabama, was made in November 2009,
but was unsuccessful because the vessel had contracted with armed
security personnel.102 This second attempt to attack the Maersk
Alabama led to a statement from Vice Admiral Bill Gortney,
Commander of the Central Command, which identified onboard
security teams as one of the “maritime industry’s best practices” and
“a great example of how merchant mariners can take pro-active action
to prevent being attacked.”103 The story of the MV Biscaglia, where the
security team was unarmed and failed to thwart off a pirate hijacking,
illustrates the need for security personnel to be armed.104

95. Id.
96. See infra Part III(C).
97. See Letters of Marque, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) [Hereinafter
Definition of Letters of Marque].
98. See J W, supra note 1.
99. Id.
100. Mahard, supra note 11, at 334.
101. See J W, supra note 1.
102. Martin, supra note 32, at 1365.
103. Alan Cowell, Pirates Attack Maersk Alabama Again, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/19/world/africa/19pirates.html.
104. The Evolution of the Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI) and
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Officials in the maritime industry agree that there is a “glaring
absence of regulation” for PMSCs.105 Maritime Officials also claim
that the number of ships reporting use of a PMSC is approximately half
as many as actually use a PMSC.106 The United Nations acknowledged
this lack of oversight in a 2008 statement, saying that with the structure
of an employee only being held accountable to their employers, which
is what occurs when there are no additional regulations from states,
“immunity can soon turn into impunity.”107 This lack of regulation
coupled with concern over the growing number of PMSCs operating
without prior maritime security experience led maritime security firms
to the decision of creating a “code of conduct and ethics” and the
International Association of Maritime Security Professionals
(“IAMSP”).108 The IAMSP, a voluntary group that self-regulates, has
around 400 members, who accounted for “half of the reputable
industry.”109 A large concern is that hundreds of ‘expatriates’ from Iraq
and Afghanistan are moving into the maritime security sector without
the specific necessary knowledge to perform the work of private
maritime security.110 One of the founders of the IAMSP stated: “We
have fears that a glut of inexperienced and unqualified so-called
maritime security operators are bringing the legit guys into
disrepute.”111 The concern does not end there; a member of the
seafarer’s union, Nautilus International, stated that: “Private security
in the marine sector is currently not regulated in the way that it is on
land . . . [t]here is a big worry this could be opening the doors to a lot
of cowboys.”112
III. ANALYSIS
In 2012, the increase of private security was attributed as one of
three main factors related to the decrease in pirate attacks that year. 113
Piracy in the Indian Ocean, supra note 72.
105. Mahard, supra note 11, at 336.
106. Id.
107. Private Security Companies Lack Oversight and Regulation – UN Working Group,
U.N. NEWS CTR. (Mar. 10, 2008), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=25924.
108. See Code of Practice, INT’L ASS’N OF MAR. SECURITY PROF.,
http://iamsponline.org/membership/code-of-practice/; Jonathan Saul, Facing Piracy, Ship
Security Firms Set Ethics Code, REUTERS (May 9, 2011, 8:28 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-shipping-security-piracy/facing-piracy-ship-securityfirms-set-ethics-code-idUSLNE74804X20110509.
109. Saul, supra note 108.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Somalia: Piracy Incidences Dip Amid Reports of Corruption, ALL AFRICA (July 24,
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While such force is at times utilized by law enforcement officers and
armed services members, regulations exist for those state actors, and
authority is given based on such regulations. In the context of maritime
security, the possibility of killing potentially innocent parties
increases, while the ability to collect evidence and adjudicate
decreases.114 Even in authorized capacities, use of force and force
escalation are hot-button issues in today’s society, which makes the
issue all the more important.
Piracy spans an area of approximately one million square miles
of the ocean, thus regulating individuals of many different nationalities
who fight against piracy is a very complex task.115 The United States
Navy “encourages” ship owners to hire armed security, but some
maritime organizations remain concerned that “armed guards may
increase the danger to ships’ crews or that overzealous contractors
might accidentally fire on fishermen.”116 Prior incidents involving
United States private security companies have shown a presumption of
guilt prior to being proven guilty course of action without any form of
legal process, which goes against the very foundation of the United
States’ criminal justice system.117 Even when most nations,
organizations, and experts agree that such regulation is necessary,
there is no clear-cut route to creating and implementing such
standards.118 Finding a “one size fits all” solution is complicated by the
involvement of individuals of various nationalities, the sheer size of
the affected ocean, crossing into territorial waters of other states, and
the high-risk interactions of security forces and pirates.
A. Previous Attempts at Finding a Solution
An early attempt at a solution was the development of the
Puntland Maritime Police Force.119 Puntland is a self-declared
autonomous state located in the north-east region of Somalia.120
Founded by the former head of Blackwater Worldwide, Erik Prince,
2012, 6:01 AM), http://allafrica.com/stories/201207231573.html.
114. Isenberg, supra note 7.
115. Martin, supra note 32, at 1366.
116. Private Security Firms Join Battle Against Somali Pirates, FOX NEWS (Oct. 26,
2008), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2008/10/26/private-security-firms-join-battle-againstsomali-pirates.html.
117. See ABC News, Hidden War Between American Mercenaries, Somali Sailors,
YOUTUBE (Oct. 11, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qJcG0cPtJO8.
118. Mahard, supra note 11.
119. Mazzetti & Schmitt, supra note 79.
120. Puntland Profile, BBC NEWS (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica-14114727.
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the creation of this Force did not occur without its share of
controversy.121 From countless mercenaries to millions of dollars in
secret payments from the United Arab Emirates, to a trainee being
beaten to death at a force training camp, the development of a
sophisticated anti-piracy fighting force was not what many had hoped
for.122 While the Force did have successes, its unsavory incidents did
not go without notice by the United Nations, which called the creation
of the group a “‘brazen, large-scale and protracted violation’ of the
arms embargo in place in Somalia.”123 This alone illustrates the dangers
and complexity of the largely outsourced fight against piracy in the
Somalia region. In light of the troubled path of this so called “private
army,” the United States, through its officials, stated that it did not
endorse the creation of such a private army.124 Somewhat contrary to
the statements of the United States officials is that the Puntland
Maritime Police Force shared some buildings with the Puntland
Intelligence Service, which received training from the United States’
Central Intelligence Agency.125 Further, Blackwater was placed under
investigation for the 2007 killing of seventeen Iraqi civilians.126 While
this incident occurred on land, the involvement of Blackwater and
other similar PMSCs in the fight against piracy highlights the dire need
for the self-regulation of this industry to come to an end to prevent
other such incidents from occurring.127
B. Complications
A large complication in the search for a suitable solution is the
weakness of the Somalian legal system. As previously mentioned,
Somalia has still not managed to successfully implement anti-piracy
legislation.128 Transparency International ranked the country of
Somalia as “the most corrupt on earth.”129 In the rare instances of
prosecutions occurring in Somalia, the sentences have been largely
inconsistent.130 Abshir Boyah, a high-level pirate leader, received a
121. Mazzetti & Schmitt, supra note 79.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Private Security Firms Join Battle Against Somali Pirates, supra note 116.
127. Id.
128. Elmi & Affi, supra note 51.
129. Jeffery Gettleman, Fueled by Bribes, Somalia’s Election Seen as Milestone of
Corruption,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
7,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/world/africa/somalia-election-corruption.html
(Transparency International is a global anticorruption organization).
130. Somalia, supra note 113.
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mere five-year sentence, while some low-level pirates have received
twenty-year sentences.131 This discrepancy was viewed as corruption
between high-level “pirate kingpins” and government officials.132
Further, Somalian President Sheik Sheriff Sheik Ahmed issued a
diplomatic passport to a pirate leader, Mohamed Abdi Hassan
‘Afweyne’, which only further fueled speculation of corruption
between the Somali government and high-level “pirate kingpins.”133
C. Solutions
A strong potential solution is to bring back letters of marque. In
the simplest terms, at its core, the purpose of the letter of marque is to
right a private wrong.134 Letters of marque are defined as “a license
authorizing a private citizen to engage in reprisals against citizens or
vessels of another country.”135 Letters of marque serve as “permits for
private individuals to use force against enemies of the state on its
behalf.”136 This old-fashioned document could be modernized and used
to provide regulation in the world of piracy and private security. After
the early 18th century, the purpose of the letter of marque shifted to be
used as a State instrument to provide permission for national navies to
“capture and plunder enemy ships.”137
Although the United States has not recently utilized letters of
marque, the United States Constitution provides for letters of marque
in Article I section 8.138 The particular circumstances at hand in this
situation, from the international occurrence to the use of private actors,
make it the perfect situation to utilize the letters of marque.139 Using
letters of marque as a solution would provide a permit for a PMSC to
utilize force against pirates, which are enemies of the state, on behalf
of the state.
While the 1856 Paris Declaration “banned” letters of marque,
this is irrelevant because although the United States has respected the

131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Letters
of
Marque,
CONSTITUTION
SOCIETY
(Nov.
2,
2017),
http://www.constitution.org/mil/lmr/marque_it.htm.
135. Definition of Letters of Marque, supra note 97.
136. Georgi Boorman, Is it Time to Bring Back Letters of Marque?, FEDERALIST (Mar. 25,
2015), http://thefederalist.com/2015/03/25/is-it-time-to-bring-back-letters-of-marque/.
137. Letters of Marque, supra note 134; Boorman, supra note 136.
138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. (“The Congress shall have the power . . . to declare War, grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal.”).
139. Definition of Letters of Marque, supra note 97.
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Declaration during military conflicts, the United States never formally
accepted the Declaration.140 In respect to utilizing letters of marque as
an international solution, it could either be added to UNCLOS or a new
treaty could be created. While the United States would have no issues
with using letters of marque as is, if a new treaty was to be formed or
added to UNCLOS for international use, letters of marque could be
slightly altered so that other states who formally assented to the 1856
Paris Declaration can also utilize this solution without violating the
Declaration.141 Further, there are many differences between the threat
faced today and the threat faced in 1856, in addition to many
differences between the privateers of concern in 1856 and today’s
PMSCs. Due to substantial developments in technology since 1856,
the ability of pirates to attack large merchant vessels has increased. 142
The ability of pirates to reach a much larger area of the ocean to
commit such attacks has also increased.143 Taking these factors into
consideration in addition to global developments in prosecution,
investigation, and oversight since 1856, letters of marque, or a slightly
varied instrument, could be utilized internationally while still
respecting the concerns held by a select few countries regarding letters
of marque in 1856.144
This solution would serve to close the gap that is the lack of
regulation of PMSCs because the security personnel would be
authorized by their state and could act in the same capacity as state
actors.145 Further, this solution would provide room for some
government control.146 Providing such permits does open the door for
potential abuses of power. However, the government would be able to
hold individuals who abuse such power accountable through
prosecution because they would be acting as state actors and subject to
prosecution as such. UNCLOS Article 107 limits “a seizure on account
of piracy” to only “warships or military aircraft, or other ships or
aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service
and authorized to that effect.”147 Utilizing letters of marque as a
solution would not conflict with UNCLOS Article 107 because the
140. Id.
141. Declaration Respecting Maritime Law. Paris, 16 April 1856, INT’L COMM. OF THE
RED CROSS (Apr. 16, 1856), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/105?OpenDocument
(Hereinafter “ICRC”).
142. Cowell, supra note 103.
143. Id.
144. ICRC, supra note 141.
145. Letters of Marque, supra note 134; see also Boorman, supra note 136.
146. Letters of Marque, supra note 134; see also Boorman, supra note 136.
147. UNCOLS, supra note 20 at 107.

ZEHNDER - PRIVATE MARITIME (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

5/15/2018 12:35 PM

PRIVATE MARITIME SECURITY COMPANIES V. PIRATES

351

PMSC would be authorized as a state actor.148
Another potential, yet complicated, solution is the use of contract
doctrine to provide regulation for PMSCs. However, the complexity
and high-risk nature of providing a contract for PMSCs who are
expected to risk their lives to protect a ship and sometimes kill pirates
prior to the pirates ever receiving a trial or any form of legal process,
likely goes beyond the control of standard contract doctrine.149 In the
incident discussed previously, the PMSCs were under employment
contracts and the contracts did not prevent such an incident, which led
to the deaths of one or more alleged pirates that did not yet attack the
ship being protected by the PMSC, without any form of due process.150
Additionally, PMSCs have been known to work around their contracts
and any current regulations by way of things such as dropping their
weapons into the ocean prior to entering weapons-restrictive ports and
other “creative workarounds to avoid the stiff fines and penalties levied
by developing and often rightfully paranoid nations in Africa and the
Middle East.”151
Further complicating matters is that a contract would possibly be
breached if security personnel decided to not put their lives in danger
and to not protect the ship, which is what they were hired to do. If the
ship’s owner brought a claim of breach, the PMSC would probably
then defend against a potential claim of breach using the common law
doctrine of impracticability or another similar defense.152 The common
law doctrine of impracticability provides a defense when “the duty to
be performed becomes unfeasibly difficult or expensive for a party
who was to perform.”153 Utilizing contract doctrine under these
circumstances is more likely to end in years of circular arguments and
expensive litigation, than in an actual workable solution for regulation
of PMSC.
However, the Montreux Document could potentially be integrated
by utilizing contractual tools. This Document covers “pertinent
international legal obligations and good practices for States related to
operations of private military and security companies during armed
conflict.”154 The Montreux Document serves as a reminder of
148. Id.
149. See generally ABC News, supra note 117.
150. Id.
151. Isenberg, supra note 7.
152. Impracticability
Law
and
Legal
Definition,
US
https://definitions.uslegal.com/i/impracticability/ (lasted visited April 3, 2018).
153. Id.
154. The
Montreux
Document,
ICRC,
1
(Aug.

LEGAL,

2009),
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international humanitarian law obligations of PMSCs and their armed
contractor employees.155 The Document has been predominantly
applied to armed conflicts that occur on land.156 In order to apply this
document to piracy off the coast of Somalia, the presumption that such
piracy is not “armed conflict” under international law would need to
be overcome.157 The Document defines the covered group, “private
military and security companies,” as “private business entities that
provide military and/or security services” including “armed guarding
and protections of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and
other places . . . .”158 The Montreux Document suggests that private
military and security companies be subject “to prosecution if they
commit conduct recognized as crimes under applicable national or
international law.”159 PMSCs working to protect against piracy fulfills
the definition of a PMSC given in the Montreux Document.160 To
utilize the Montreux Document in the current scenario using contract
doctrine, states would hire a PMSC through a contract which includes
provisions of the Montreux Document.161 The Montreux Document
provides states with criteria for the selection of a PMSC and terms of
use in the contracting process.162
The conflict between PMSCs and pirates is certainly an “armed
conflict” in the sense of both sides being armed. However, it is
questionable whether this conflict will meet the level of “armed
conflict” discussed in the Montreux Document because the armed
factor of this conflict is not as large as with armed conflicts on land
where there are thousands of casualties. As made apparent in the
November 2017 meeting of the United Nations Security Council, the
United Nations is in need of further international support in the
counter-piracy fight because what has been done thus far has not been
enough, which potentially leaves room for a different approach.163

https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf.
155. Joel Christopher Coito, Pirates vs. Private Security: Commercial Shipping, the
Montreux Document, and the Battle for the Gulf of Aden, 101 CAL. L. REV. 173, 174 (2013).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. The Montreux Document, supra note 154, at 9.
159. Id. at 15.
160. Id. at 9.
161. Id. at 10.
162. Id. at 17–18.
163. Press Release, supra note 82.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The unregulated, violent interactions164 between pirates and
PMSCs and the lack of state interference, are indicative of a need for
regulation. While the situation is extremely intricate due to the lack of
proper enforcement by the Somali government and the use of non-state
security forces, potential solutions do exist.165 Utilization of PMSCs
has been shown, in conjunction with other efforts, to decrease the
amount of pirate attacks. However, in some cases the cost of
prevention has led to killings at the hands of PMSCs without any
specific regulation.166 While utilizing and reforming traditional
contract doctrine in conjunction with the Montreux Document could
be useful, letters of marque appear to be the most promising solution.
This is due to the fact that letters of marque would provide
authorization for private individuals to act on behalf of the government
and thus allow governmental control and avoid violating UNCLOS
Article 107. Particularly, this solution puts an end to PMSCs,
especially those that have no formal training in maritime security,
exercising force at their own discretion. As seen on video,167 such
regulation is desperately needed to avoid continuing on a track of
executions without any form of legal process.

164.
165.
166.
167.

ABC News, supra note 117.
Supra Part III(C).
See ABC News, supra note 117.
Id.

